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  Corn trade between the European Union (EU) and the United States has undergone 
substantial changes over the past decade. EU Reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), beginning with the Mac Sharry Reforms of 1992 and continuing with the Agenda 2000 
Reforms, were directed at bringing EU agricultural policy into compliance with World Trade 
Organization (WTO) provisions.  These reforms have brought about considerable changes in the 
market structure in corn trade. However, while trade has been facilitated by decoupling payments 
and removing levies and tariffs on imported corn, EU’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures have negated some of the progress in trade between EU countries and the United 
States. Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), in the form of SPS measures, have progressively 
replaced traditional tariff and non-tariff trade barriers while allowing the EU to remain in 
compliance with WTO regulations. The absence of recognizing equivalency in production 
procedures has created a further decline in corn trade accounting for over $300 million loss 
annually to U.S. corn exports since 1997 (Weyerbrock and Xia 2000). Using data obtained from 
the USDA and EUROSTAT, we develop a three stage simultaneous equation model to estimate 
the economic impact of TBTs on EU-U.S. bilateral corn trade for specific EU countries. Further, 
welfare effects for producers and consumers in EU countries are also estimated. 
 
Key Words:  Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures, Technical Barriers to Trade, Common 
Agricultural Policy, Agenda 2000 Reforms, Genetically Modified corn, welfare effects   2
Introduction 
Trade in corn between the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) has 
substantially decreased over the last twenty years. U.S. share of corn exports to the EU, which 
was 44% in 1980, declined to slightly less than 21% by 2003 (Anderson and Jackson 2003). EU-
U.S. bilateral cereal trade in general and corn trade, in particular, is largely governed by 
domestic and agricultural trade policies. Trade negotiations under the General Agreement on 
Tariff and Trade (GATT), specifically the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), and later under the 
Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have bought about considerable changes 
in the market structure in corn trade. Additionally, bilateral trade has been affected by the 
expiration in 2004 of concession treaties like the Blair House Accord (WTO).  
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), which are WTO-compliant, have progressively 
replaced traditional tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. On the one hand, trade between the EU 
and United States has been facilitated by decoupling payments and removing import restrictions 
like levies and high tariffs on corn (as a result of the Mac Sharry Reforms of 1992 and the 
Agenda 2000 Reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy). On the other hand, Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary measures (SPS), that are conspicuous TBT, have set back some of the gains 
realized from trade reform between these trade partners. By not recognizing equivalency in 
production procedures, the United States has lost $300 million annually since 1997 in lower corn 
exports to the EU (Weyerbrock and Xia 2000). While the Uruguay round initiated a substantial 
cut in the corn export subsidies and granted more market access to the EU (Kennedy,  Koo and 
Marchant 1999), policy differences in these countries toward Genetically Modified (GM) corn 
created a new TBT. New technologies and products led to regulatory changes that created trade 
frictions between trade partners. Labeling directives and low tolerance for the unintentional   3
presence of GM materials for approved grain products have negatively impacted EU consumer 
preferences for U.S. products (Redick and Adrian 2005). 
Internal changes for both of these major players in world agricultural trade, coupled with 
transformed bilateral trade relations under the auspices of the WTO, have affected bilateral 
transactions and global markets. These reforms have impacted both EU and U.S. consumption 
and production, trade and world prices, and could subsequently provoke trade liberalization and 
new policy initiatives in other sectors. This paper investigates the effects of CAP reforms and 
SPS regulations on corn imported from the U.S. on EU production and consumption.   
Additionally we estimate welfare effects of SPS regulations on EU countries. 
Related Literature 
  Understanding the complex economics of these relatively recent regulatory barriers is 
vital for future trade liberalization. Ambiguity still exists in defining these SPS regulations. 
Roberts, Joslings and Orden (1999) proposed a comprehensive definition for these TBTs and 
present an analytical framework for evaluating them that summarizes most of what the various 
authors have adopted. They distinguish three economic effects: (1) the “regulatory protection” 
effect, which reflects rents to the domestic sector from trade-restrictive regulations; (2) the 
“supply shift” effect, which focuses on the effects of imports on the domestic supply and 
compliance costs; and (3) the “demand shift” effect, which accounts for the fact that a regulation 
may increase information about a product and increase consumer demand for that product. Using 
comparative statics in a partial equilibrium framework, the authors illustrate the different effects 
of these three components of TBTs, including welfare effects. 
Calvin and Krissoff (1998) estimated the tariff rate equivalent of technical regulations for 
the apple market using the price wedge method. The study compared the CIF price of US apples   4
in a foreign country to the wholesale price and assumed that this gap consisted of the tariff and 
the technical barrier tariff rate. The method incorporates quality adjustments to make products 
homogenous. This method measures the gap of a country’s tariff equivalent and also adjusts for 
quality differences. The major limitation of this method is that though it can quantify the effect 
of a set of NTB’s (Non Tariff trade barriers) it cannot identify each NTB that could affect the 
price of foreign good. Also a major assumption is that imported goods are perfect substitutes to 
domestically produced goods which may not be the case in a large amount of agricultural 
products. Finally, for large scale studies available, the data is too aggregated to provide for 
quality differentiation for imported goods. 
Swann Temple and Shurmer (1996) defined a measure called the import coverage ratio 
constructed as the value of imports of each commodity subject to an NTB, as a percentage of 
imports in the corresponding product category. The authors regressed British net exports, 
exports, and imports over a period of 1985 to 1991 on variables including frequency indicators of 
NTB’s. Wilson and Sewadeh (2000) employed a direct measure of severity of food safety 
standards expressed in minimum allowable contamination. A major limitation of these two 
studies was that they showed very little correlation between the number of measures and the 
effect on trade.  
More recent studies show that risk-assessment based Cost-Benefit measures provide more 
insight on the impact of NTB’s on bilateral trade. Bigsby and Whyte (2000) and James and 
Anderson (1998)  
To gauge the welfare effects and implications to various players in bilateral trade, micro- 
econometric studies that rely on partial equilibrium models have been used by various authors. 
Marett Bureau and Gozhan (2000) show how regulations could change the costs of signaling   5
quality of products. This gives rise to network externalities and economies of scale where the 
major contribution of this study was that they could assess not only the impact of regulations on 
trade flows but also quantify attendant welfare effects.  
To account for the welfare effects of a standard in the presence of negative externalities, 
Maskus, Wilson and Otsuki (2001) and Fisher and Serra (2000) characterize a standard as non-
protectionist if it is used by all domestic firms . Peterson et al., (1988), suggested that sanitary 
regulations could be artificial barriers to trade.  However, they pointed out the difficulty in 
distinguishing between legitimate barriers to protect consumer health as opposed to non-
legitimate methods, designed rather for the purpose of protecting domestic producers from 
cheaper imports. In their analysis, they indicated that an EU ban on hormones in livestock 
production would significantly decrease the world price of edible offal, while domestic price 
could increase by 35% - 45%. U.S. livestock sales to the EU were estimated to have decreased 
by 32% since 1986 due to these specific EU directives.  
Weyerbrock and Xia (2000) identified 57 TBTs that the EU has put into place since 1997. 
Of these, the major economic impacts have been on cereals and animal products which 
accounted for over one-third of the United States’ total trade loss. In a recent study on the 
structure of Non-tariff Trade Barriers (NTB’s), Disdier, Fontagne and Mimouni (2008) analyzed 
the coverage ratio (affected imports to total imports) and found that it was quite high for extra-
EU trade. Their results suggested that EU’s SPS regulations formed a significant barrier to trade. 
Because SPS regulations appear to be used as a TBT by the EU to protect domestic 
farmers, there is interest in determining how significant an effect this has had on U.S. corn 
exports. Jayasinghe, Beglin, and Moschini (2008) investigated the determinants of world demand 
for U.S. corn and the cost associated with the introduction of SPS regulations. They concluded   6
that tariffs by foreign countries, including the EU (a major importer), form the major impediment 
to U.S. corn exports.  However, they also indicated that SPS regulations are fast replacing these 
tariffs as trade barriers.  
While earlier studies have tried to isolate the effects of TBT regulations on multilateral 
trade or have focused on the welfare impacts, little has been done to understand the 
disaggregated affect of these TBTs on the two main trading blocks in the corn trade sector. In 
this study we analyze policy changes in the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and their 
effects on the corn trade with the U.S. This study contributes to the literature by estimating 
empirically whether changes in the corn policies of the EU (including the SPS regulations and 
CAP reforms) have had a significant impact on the trade between the U.S. and member nations 
of the EU. We incorporate the effects of interest group diversity in the two trading entities, the 
effects of trade frictions caused by the five year moratorium on GM grown corn in the U.S. (that 
accounts for the complex TBT and SPS regulations on GM grown corn and could have 
significant effects on U.S. trade position), the EU Traceability and Labeling (Commission 
Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268)) directive, and finally major CAP reforms aimed at 
decoupled payments and trade liberalization between the EU and U.S. Finally, we estimate 
welfare effects on producers and consumers of EU member nations. 
Theoretical Model 
We develop a theoretical model based on the Fischer and Serra (2000) trade model for 
implications of standards on trade. The basic premise in the introduction of standards (SPS 
regulations) is to increase quality both in the exporting and in the importing country. This, 
though, has a negative externality of increased production cost and indirect effect of protecting 
domestic farmers in the importing country. Considering that goods are homogenous in both   7
trading blocks, which is true in the case of corn, but dissimilar standards between the two trading 
partners could potentially create trade barriers. Under a minimum standard τ, the EU tries to 





Where π is domestic profits,    is the quantity of home production demand in domestic markets, 
qe is the quantity of imports demanded by domestic consumers, and p is the domestic inverse 
demand function. When there are no minimum standards, τ will equal 0 and the constant term 
c(τ) will fall out of the equation.  
The minimum standard requirement will increase U.S. production cost and decrease profits. U.S. 
production will choose to produce under two standards – one for home and the other for exports 
or produce under the higher standard set by EU. Thus, the United States will maximize its profits 
by solving for either producing under one standard in which case it solves for 
(B) 
 
or use two standards and incur a fixed cost F, where it solves for 
(C)      
 
When π1 > π2, the U.S. will then start producing under the new standard set by EU regulations. 
Finally, the welfare loss due to this standard in the EU can be calculated as the sum of consumer 
surplus and negative externality due to standards minus the sum of cost of domestic production 
and the cost of imports. Formally 
(D) 
 
Where    ,  , is the loss associated with the standard and is less than zero.   8
Economic Model 
  Numerous studies have analyzed the effect of SPS regulations; employing diverse 
empirical estimation techniques. For example, Deardoff and Stern (1998) and Laird and Yeats 
(1990) used the price wedge method to estimate a tariff equivalent to these TBTs. Though this 
method measures trade impacts, it can be used in the initial stages of partial and general 
equilibrium models that focus on the welfare effects of the TBTs (Beglin and Bureau 2001).  
The inventory-based approach has become more prominent with two studies that related 
trade flows to measures of a country’s stock of standards. Swann, Temple, and Shurmer (1996) 
used counts of voluntary national and international standards recognized by the United Kingdom 
and Germany.  In that study, British net exports, exports, and imports over the period from 1985 
to1991 were analyzed with frequency indicators of standards. In that study, and one by Moenius 
(1999), the authors used counts of binding standards in a given industry as a measure of 
stringency of standards. Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2000) extended that approach by 
developing a direct measure of the severity of food safety standards as a function of the 
maximum allowable contamination. 
Fontagné, von Kirchbach, and Mimouni (2001) used a more sophisticated indicator for 
assessing the impact of environmental regulations and their potential use as a trade barrier. 
Combining inventory-based approach with a gravity model, Disdier, Fontagne and Mimouni 
(2008), focused on 700 products and regional trading blocks to provide evidence that SPS and 
TBT regulations significantly effect trade flows. While these studies can direct attention to the 
frequency of occurrence and the trade or production coverage of various types of NTBs, 
inventory-based methods do not quantify the effects of regulations on trade per se.   9
  Moenius (1999) attempted to measure directly the trade impact of TBTs using gravity-
based analysis of bilateral trade volumes. Due to data limitations, he analyzed the trade impacts 
of standards (voluntary norms) rather than on regulations. Panel data that Moenius used included 
471 industries in 12 western European nations and ranged in time from 1980 to 1995. He found 
that a shared standard has a large trade promoting effect between the nations sharing the 
standard. By correcting for autocorrelation and testing for causality, Moenius was able to 
estimate the impact of a one-percent increase in the number of bilaterally shared standards on 
bilateral trade volume. 
  Partial equilibrium models are used to assess the effects of policy on equilibrium prices, 
quantity, and welfare. Orden and Romano (1996) used explicit specification of supply and 
demand functions within such a model to estimate the costs and benefits of a ban on avocados. 
Calvin and Krissoff (1998) also combined the price wedge method with a simple partial 
equilibrium framework (using only estimated supply and demand elasticities) to analyze 
Japanese imports of U.S. apples. Paarlberg and Lee (1998) included a risk-based approach to a 
partial equilibrium framework in studying U.S. restrictions of beef imports from countries that 
may have foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). 
  Quantification of the trade and welfare effects of SPS and TBT regulations is possible 
when using a partial equilibrium approach to understand country-wise effects and to estimate the 
welfare of various interest groups vis-à-vis producers and consumers in each of the trading 
countries. We employ this partial equilibrium approach to develop our model and incorporate 
simultaneity in our model.  
To understand the effects of policy re-instrumentation, including the SPS regulations in 
member countries of the EU, and the trade effects between each of these countries with the U.S.   10
we developed a static, partial equilibrium, simultaneous equation model which solves for the 
demand side equations and the supply side equations simultaneously. The model incorporates the 
interdependence of both the supply and demand side equations. An iterative, linear, three stage 
least square (3SLS) system is developed. Two dummy variables are introduced in the system that 
account for the two major policy changes in the CAP of the EU. SPS regulations were introduced 
as a dummy from 1998 to 2005 to capture any significant impacts of these regulations on prices 
and quantity of corn imported by each of the EU countries. 
Demand side equations are disaggregated into four equations – inventory demand, 
domestic demand, export demand and import demand, while the supply side is a single equation. 
Table 1 contains descriptions of each variable defined in the equations below. 
Demand Side System 
The demand side system includes four equations which can help us understand the 
specific effects of policy changes in the EU.  
Inventory Demand 
In equation (1), inventory demand is expressed as the demand for opening stocks (opstk ) and is 
a function of domestic price (dmpr ) and the ratio of apparent production (prod) and apparent 
consumption (conp), defined over commodity i, country j, year t, and e serving as a random 
disturbance term. 
() ( ) 12 1 (1)   ln ln ln ln ln ln ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ij t opstk dmpr prod prod impq conp e − ⎡ ⎤ =+ + + + + ⎣ ⎦ αβ β  
Domestic Demand 
The demand for a commodity in a specific country is the domestic demand function. An 
inverse demand function is used to estimate the effect on domestic prices of other independent 
variables. Inverse demand functions have been widely used in farm commodity market analysis   11
(see Wescott and Hull 1985, Salathe, Price and Gadson 1982, Subotnik and Houck 1979, Meilke 
and Young 1972, Cromarty 1959). The importance of a normalized simultaneous system of 
equation needs a causative specification for each variable including the price.  This justifies the 
use of an inverse demand function because it otherwise would give erroneous results if none of 
the equations normalized on price. The domestic price (dmpr) is a function of domestic 
consumption (conp), opening stocks (opstk), income as measured by the Gross Domestic Product 
(gdp) and two dummy variables (mref, aref) for the two major CAP reforms as indicated in 
equation (2).  
12 3 4 5 (2)  ln ln ln ln ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt dmpr conp opstk gdp mref aref e =+ + + + + + α ββ β β β  
Export Demand 
The export demand equation relates the effect of policy changes on demand of exports for 
commodities of a specific country. Policy effects causing changes in trade yield insights about 
the impact on trade and world prices. Equation (3) models the demand for EU exports (expq) as a 
function of the two CAP reform measures (mref, aref), export refunds (expr), domestic price 
(dmpr), world price (worldp) and exchange rates (exrt). Since SPS regulations are hypothesized 
to affect exports, we include a dummy (sps) to capture any significant impact of this policy 
change on domestic exports. 
12 3 4 5
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(3)  lnexp ln ln exp ln
                       
q dmpr worldp r exrt mref
aref sps e
=+ + + + +
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Import demand is modeled in the system of equations to understand the effect on corn 
imports brought about by EU policy changes. We include a ratio of quantities imported from the 
U.S. to total EU imports of corn as a measure of significance. Significance of this ratio suggests 
that policy changes in the EU have affected the demand of corn imports from the U.S. Equation   12
(4) relates the log of the import quantities as a function of domestic price (dmpr), exchange rate 
(exrt), world price (worldp), import levies (impl) and the ratio of imports from the U.S. to total 
EU imports.  
12 3 4 5 6
78
(4)  ln ln ln ln
                       +  ( / )
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The supply equation relates total domestic supply of commodities or production (prod) as 
a function of domestic price (dmpr), total imports, production refunds (prodr), the two policy 
changes in the CAP (mref and aref) and GDP (gdp) in equation (5).  
12 3 4 5 (5)  ln ln ln ln ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt prod dmpr prodr gdp mref aref e =+ + + + + + α ββ β β β  
Data and Methods 
The basic data for corn for the fifteen EU countries (EU-15) analyzed, included annual 
production, consumption and crop yield information collected from the ‘AGRIS’ Database of 
EUROSTAT.  External trade data between EU nations and the United States (annual exports and 
imports) were collected from the ‘COMEXT’ database (‘Internal and External Trade of the 
European Union’). Demographic information on population, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
Nominal Exchange Rates were collected from the International Financial Statistics database 
published by the International Monetary Foundation (IMF).   
Domestic price information for the EU-15 was obtained from the office of the Director 
General (DG) of Agriculture for the EU. Price support data for corn were based on The Common 
Organization of the Market in Cereals (Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2727/75) and Particular 
and Special Intervention Measures for Cereals (Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1146/76). Prior 
to 1995, three prices were defined by the European Commission – Target Price, Threshold Price   13
and Intervention Price. Price supports, including import levies, export refunds and production 
refunds, were derived from these three reference prices. Legislation from 1994 repealed such 
derived price measurements and replaced it with direct aid payments under each category 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1866/94).  
Because trade data were unavailable for Finland and Sweden for the entire time series 
analyzed, they were excluded from our analysis. However, it may be reasonable to assume that 
these countries would follow the general trend in trade along with the rest of the EU nations 
analyzed.  
Calculating the Import Levies 
Data for import levies were collected from the Official Journal of the European Union 
maintained by the EURO-LEX (European Legislation). Import levies (IL), as defined by the 
European Commission (EC), consisted of a fixed component (calculated as the difference 
between Threshold Price (ThP) and World Price (WP)) and a variable component (Z ) (defined 
as a factor of the fixed component and revised bi-monthly). Thus, annual import levies were the 
sum of the difference of Threshold Price and World Price and the average of the monthly 
weighted import levy (K), based on the ratio of the import quantity in that month to total imports 
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World Price as calculated in equation (7) is an average of the weighted export price, 
based on the quantity of the commodity exported by that country relative to the total exports for 
that commodity in a specific year. The prices of major exporting countries that constituted 80 
percent of total world market exports defined the world price. 
1
            (where   = number of exporting countries)
where   is exporting countries 
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Calculating the Export Refunds 
Export refunds (ER) were calculated in equation (8) as the difference between the 
intervention price (IP) and the world price (WP) (Regulation (EEC) No 2746/75). 
( ) (8)       ij ij ij ERI P W P =−  
Calculating Production Refunds 
Production refunds (PR) for corn were calculated for each marketing year and were 
available from the ‘EUROLEX’ database. These were calibrated to total domestic production for 
each of the fifteen European countries. While the EC reviewed the amount of production refund, 
it also enacted legislations governing the calculation of production refunds (Council regulation 
(EEC) No: 1863/88). In estimating production refunds for years in which data were not available, 
we used equation (9).  
(9)     ij ij PR K IP =−  
The Mac Sharry reforms (Council regulation (EEC) No: 1766/92) introduced co-
responsibility levies and voluntary set-asides. These instruments, aimed at making producers 
more responsive to markets, were included as a part of production refunds, as seen in equation 
(10).   15
(10)       ij ij ij PR K SP CRL ⎡⎤ =− − ⎣⎦  
Conversion Factor and Exchange Rates 
To incorporate the effects of the Monetary Compensatory Amount (MCA) system that 
was utilized until 1992, we used the Agri-Monetary System conversion rate (Swinbank 1988). 
MCAs were collected from the Economic Accounts for Agriculture (EAA) and the Handbook for 
EU price statistics. After 1992, conversion factors for U.S. dollars were based on nominal 
exchange rates given by the (IMF).   
Apparent Production and Consumption 
Production (prod) for each of the country was derived in equation (11) as a function of 
area under a specific crop (area) and yield per hectare (yield). 
(11)    ijk ijk ijk PROD YIELD AREA =×  
In equation (12), consumption (conp) for each country is a function of domestic 
production (dmpr), imports (impq), opening stocks (opstk) and total exports (expq).  
() (12)   ijk ijk ijk CONP DPROD IMPQ OPSTK EXPQ =+ + −  
Results and Discussions 
The simultaneous system of equations helps us to understand the cross correlation effects 
of the independent variables across different equations. The parameter estimates give us 
elasticities for independent variables because of the double log model estimated.  Elasticity 
results for the independent variables in the system are found in table 3. We tested for normality 
for the entire time series data using the Shapiro-Wilk method and rejected the null hypothesis 
that the distribution of the residuals was not normal. Heteroscedasticity for the residuals was 
assessed using the Breusch-Pagan test and White’s test. The null hypothesis, that the error 
variance of the independent variables was not constant, was rejected in the case where the p-  16
value was greater than 0.05 for a 95 percent confidence interval. Finally, we tested for co-
linearity in the independent variables using the Durbin Watson test. No correlation between the 
independent variables for each of the countries was found.  
The system of equations was evaluated using four criteria: the magnitude of the 
coefficient (suggesting how elastic or inelastic it is relative to the dependent variable), the sign of 
the coefficient (is dependent variable positively related to the independent variable), the 
statistical significance of the coefficient at the 90 percent significance level, the goodness of fit 
for each of the equations in the system.  In Table 2 we present the effect of the policy re-
instrumentations in the member countries of the EU for corn.  In each row, the table presents the 
parameter name, the number of counties for which that specific independent variable was 
significant (90%-level), and the expected sign for that variable. For example in the first row, 
domestic price (a2) was significant in eight countries had a negative relationship with inventory 
demand. 
Inventory Demand  
Inventory demand, which relates opening stocks, domestic price and the ratio of apparent 
production to apparent consumption of corn, had the expected results as to significance. An 
increase in domestic prices, influenced by the increased quantity demanded, decreases opening 
stocks. This relation holds true in the EU, with the exception of the Netherlands, demonstrating 
that domestic prices are related to the opening stocks. Eight (France, Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, the UK and Greece) of the twelve EU countries analyzed showed this significant, 
negative relationship (Table 2 and Table 3). 
With the exception of the Netherlands, the magnitude of the parameters suggests that the 
relationship between the apparent production-apparent consumption ratio to opening stocks is 
highly elastic. An increase in the ratio would increase the opening stocks. This relationship holds   17
for all the twelve EU countries in our analysis. Empirical findings suggest this relationship is 
significant for most EU countries included:  France, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, 
Ireland, Italy, Spain, the UK and Greece. 
Domestic Demand  
 
The domestic demand equation was modeled as a price dependent equation with the 
domestic price being a function of consumption, opening stocks, country GDP (proxy for 
expendable income of the population), and dummy variables for each policy change to the CAP. 
Empirical results showed that consumption decreased as domestic prices increased and thus were 
inversely related as economic theory suggests. However, this relationship was only significant in 
three countries: Austria, Denmark and Portugal.  
An increased quantity of opening stocks should decrease the domestic prices since the 
supply of the commodity increases. This negative relationship was observed empirically in ten of 
the twelve EU countries, with seven being significant:  France, Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Denmark, Greece and Portugal.  Elasticity estimates indicate that the relationship is highly 
elastic for Portugal, Denmark, Germany and Ireland while it is inelastic for the rest of the EU 
nations (Table 2 and Table 4).  
GDP was positively related to domestic prices; suggesting that as expendable income 
increases the demand for goods increases and prices, hence, tend to increase. This conforms to 
economic theory which suggests that increased income has a positive effect on prices. Eight of 
the EU countries show a significant and negative relationship:  France, Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK and Portugal.    18
The dummy variables for the two policy reforms show that they had a significant, 
negative impact on domestic price. All EU countries showed that the relation was significant for 
both policy reforms (Mac Sharry and Agenda 2000).  
Export Demand  
Estimated parameters for export demand displayed signs consistent with economic 
expectations, and were significant, for the most part. The quantity exported depends on domestic 
price, world price, export refund, exchange rates and dummy variables for each of the two 
reforms of the CAP modeled. As hypothesized, exports also were affected by the SPS 
regulations.  
Economic theory suggests that an increase in domestic price should decrease quantity 
exported as domestic markets become more attractive for the sale of the commodities. Our 
empirical findings confirmed this for all EU countries with Austria, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Greece showing a significant, elastic relationship.  On the other hand, an increase in world price 
should increase quantity exported. All EU countries in our analysis demonstrated this 
relationship with France, Austria, Italy, The Netherlands and Spain being statistically significant 
at the 90 percent level and elastic.  
In theory, export refunds tend to increase the amount of quantity exported and our results 
for all EU countries demonstrated this positive relationship for corn (Table 2 and Table 5), with 
France, Austria, Germany, Ireland, The Netherlands, Greece and Portugal being statistically 
significant.  France, Germany, and the Netherlands had highly elastic responses to these export 
refunds for corn. 
An increase in the exchange rate of an exporting country tends to increase the amount of 
exports to other countries. Our findings demonstrate that this relationship held for all EU nations   19
with eight countries being statically significant. France, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, The 
Netherlands, the UK and Greece showed an elastic response in corn exports to changes in the 
exchange rates.  
The policy re-instrumentation of the CAP showed mixed effects on the quantity exported 
with Denmark and Ireland increasing exports as a result of implementing Mac Sharry Reforms, 
though these were not significant statistically. On the other hand, our findings indicate that 
Germany, the UK and Greece significantly decreased exports as a result of the Mac Sharry 
Reforms. The Agenda 2000 Reforms of the CAP had a positive and statistically significant 
impact on exports of corn from France and Ireland. The rest of the EU countries had negative 
coefficients in our model estimation from the Agenda 2000 reforms, suggesting that exports of 
corn to other countries declined considerably.  
In all but two EU countries, SPS regulations decreased the amount of exports from the 
EU. This is evidence that domestic consumption of EU products tended to increase with SPS 
policy initiatives. The dummy variable for SPS regulations was statistically significant in one-
half of EU countries, including all the major corn producing countries: Germany, France and the 
UK. 
Import Demand  
Quantity of corn imported depends on the domestic prices of corn, the world prices, the 
exchange rate, applied import levies (a combination of fixed and variable levies), expendable 
income of the population (GDP), and the policy dummies to capture changes in the amount of 
imports resulting from that policy. Statistically significant relations were observed for most of 
the variables in the model (Table 2 and Table 6).    20
Theory suggests that an increase in domestic price should attract more imports and this is 
the relationship found empirically for all EU countries. For Austria, France, Germany, Denmark, 
Ireland, Italy, The relationship between imports and domestic prices for the Netherlands, the UK 
and Portugal was statically significant and elastic. On the other hand, an increase in world price 
should decrease the amount of imports since imports would become relatively costly. This 
relationship was found for all EU countries in our analysis, though only the UK had a statistical 
significant parameter estimate. The fact that world price was insignificant for most countries 
could be due to domestic markets being insulated from the world market via an extensive system 
of price regimes controlled by CAP policies. Figure 1 illustrates this finding where domestic 
prices in the UK were kept relatively higher than the world price while imports were kept low 
through the presence of import levies and the internal exchange rate system. This was true for all 
EU countries, though the magnitude of the difference between the domestic and world prices 
differed. 
As the exchange rate increases, the amount of imports should decrease since commodities 
become relatively costly. This economic relationship held true for all EU nations in our analysis 
with France, Germany, The Netherlands, Spain, the UK and Portugal having statistically 
significant yet relatively inelastic relationships between import quantity and exchange rates. 
As with increases in exchange rates, import levies also act to deter imports from other 
countries and hence an increase in the import levies decreased the quantity of corn imported to 
the EU. All EU nations, save for Italy and Ireland, demonstrated this negative relationship.   
France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Greece showed a statistically significant negative 
relationship between import levies and the quantity of imported corn.   21
An increase in the spending power of the population would effectively enable them to 
demand more imported goods. Findings from our analysis corroborate this for the demand of 
corn imported by EU nations. This relationship was statistically significant in France, Germany, 
Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal. The magnitude of the coefficients suggests that 
except for Spain, Greece and Portugal the relation is inelastic. 
Changes in the CAP had mixed impacts on the imports of corn in the EU nations. 
Implementation of Mac Sharry reforms had a significant, positive impact on Greece and 
Portugal; while France and Denmark experienced a decrease in imports due to these reforms in 
1992. The Agenda 2000 Reforms have largely had a negative impact on imports with them being 
statistically significant in France, Germany, Ireland and Italy. Under Agenda 2000 Reforms, 
Portugal increased the amount of corn it imported.  
Except for three countries (Denmark, Ireland and Greece), SPS regulations had a negative 
impact on imports of corn into the EU.  This result supports the notion that SPS regulations 
effectively serve as technical barriers to trade as imports of the commodity in question decreased 
when SPS regulations were implemented. The negative impact on corn imports from US was 
expected as SPS regulations work as an import levy while being WTO compliant. In France, 
Austria, Germany, Italy Spain and UK these effects were statistically significant. 
Supply Equation  
Supply of corn depends on domestic prices, production refunds that farmers were paid, 
expendable income (GDP), and the two dummies for the policy changes in the CAP. An increase 
in domestic price should increase the amount of corn supplied since it is profitable for farmers to 
produce more. Our empirical analysis demonstrates this as all the coefficients show a positive   22
relation to quantities supplied. Except the UK, all EU countries had a statistically significant, 
positive relationship (Table 2 and Table 7).  
Production refunds also create incentives for increased production and increased quantity 
supplied of corn. Results from our analysis demonstrate that production refunds have a positive 
effect on corn production in all EU nations. In Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the 
Netherlands this relationship was significant and positive. 
As household income (GDP) increases, one would anticipate that the consumption of 
goods would increase and this was found in all EU countries, with Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
The Netherlands, Greece and Portugal all having significant, relationships. Except for the 
Netherlands, all countries had inelastic supply for corn.  The elastic supply case of the 
Netherlands suggests that a slight change in the household income could increase the amount of 
corn supplied by a significant amount. 
The two dummy variables which captured significant changes in supply due to the 
implementation of the policies showed mixed results. France, Germany and Denmark showed 
that the Mac Sharry Reforms actually helped increase corn production in these countries, though 
they were not statistically significant.  On the other hand, the rest of the countries showed a 
negative effect on the production of corn due to Mac Sharry Reforms being implemented. 
Belgium, Spain and Greece showed that the effect of the reforms were significant. All the EU 
countries decrease corn production under the reforms of the Agenda 2000 of the CAP, and in 
Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Spain and Greece such reductions were statistically significant. 
Welfare Implications 
Our partial equilibrium model approach is useful in understanding the welfare 
implications to the interest groups (producers and consumers) of the EU member countries. It   23
accounts for substitution in demand (foreign and domestic corn) while allowing for adjustments 
to a new price level without the regulation in place. Partial equilibrium models provide for an 
explicit specification of supply and demand functions that can be used to evaluate the welfare 
effects of these restrictions on the producers and consumers in each EU country.   
To generalize, consider an algebraic representation presented in the following equations. 
In equation (13), supply of corn in the EU depends on the domestic price in the EU, the world 
price, the production refunds and a restriction factor (R). The restriction factor, as seen in 
equation (14), is a function of a factor (γ) which represents the maximum EU allowed GM 
residue in corn (0.9%) and the ratio of the total imports from the U.S. (IMPLus) to all corn 
imports (IMPLTOT) into the EU.  
 
Now, as seen in equation (15), the demand for corn in EU countries would be a function 
of the domestic price, import restrictions, and consumers’ disposable income. 
 
Equating these equations and using the derived elasticities for each of the countries from 
our model we can calculate the welfare effects for producers and consumers of the EU and gauge 
the deadweight loss caused by these policies. Net welfare effects are shown in Table 8. Results 
are presented as a percent change in quantity from the baseline due to the one percent change in 
the price. Producer surplus is positive and highly so in France, Germany, and Greece – some of 
the main corn producers in the EU-15. On the other hand, consumer surplus is negative in all the 
EU nations – indicating that consumers are potentially negatively affected by the SPS policy 
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restrictions. Estimated net welfare changes are negative for all EU countries; reflecting the 
inclusion of government transfers and deadweight losses in the net welfare estimate (Table 8).  
Conclusions 
This study develops a partial equilibrium model that incorporates the simultaneity of 
supply and demand, and implications of Sanitary and Phytosanitary regulations on the two major 
corn players in the world. While there are many disagreements between the EU and the U.S. on 
trade issues, SPS regulations have created new challenges that need to be addressed for trade 
liberalization. This paper attempts to quantify the negative effects of these trade regulations that 
are considered WTO compliant. Welfare analysis helps identify the costs of the regulations and 
assess whether they are in proportion to the externality they seek to address, or whether they are 
mainly implemented for protecting domestic producers. Findings from our analysis indicated 
positive producer welfare effects and negative consumer welfare effects.  However, if EU 
consumers have willingly embraced SPS regulations to mitigate externalities related to perceived 
or real adverse effects of GM corn, then these values could be considered estimates of the 
welfare consumers are willing to forego to restrict GM corn from entering the EU market.     25
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Variable Name  Definition  Units 
LNDMPR  Log of Domestic Price  U.S. Dollars per Ton 
(LNPROD+LNIMPQ)/LNCONP  Log of Ratio of Apparent production to Apparent consumption  1000 Tons 
LNCONP  Log of Consumption  1000 Tons 
MREF  Dummy Variable for Mac Sharry Reforms   
SPS  Dummy Variable for  SPS regulations   
AREF  Dummy Variable for Agenda 2000 Reforms   
LNOPSTK  Log of Opening Stocks  1000 Tons 
LNGDP  Log of Gross Domestic Product  Million U.S. Dollars 
LNWORLDP  Log of World Price  U.S. Dollars per Ton 
LNEXPR  Log of Export Refund  U.S. Dollars per Ton 
LNEXRT  Log of Exchange Rates 
Domestic Currency per 
U.S. Dollar 
LNIMPL  Log of Import Levies  U.S. Dollars per Ton 
LNIMPQU/LNIMPQ  Log of Ratio of Imports from United States to Total Imports  1000 Tons 
LNPRODR  Log of Production Refunds  U.S. Dollars per Ton 
LNEXPQ  Log of Export Quantity  1000 Tons 
LNIMPQ  Log of Import Quantity  1000 Tons 
LNPROD  Log of Domestic Production  1000 Tons   28
Table 2. Parameter Definitions and Expected Signs 




a2 LNDMPR  Domestic Price  8  - 
a3  (LNPROD+LNIMPQ)/
LNCONP 
Ratio of Apparent Consumption and 
Production  9 + 
b2 LNCONP  Consumption 3  - 
b3 MREF  Dummy for Mac Sharry Reforms  12  - 
b4 AREF  Dummy for Agenda 2000 Reforms  12  - 
b5 LNOPSTK  Opening Stocks  7  - 
b6 LNGDP  GDP 8  + 
c2 LNDMPR  Domestic Price  4  - 
c3 LNWORLDP  World Price  5  + 
c4 LNEXPR  Export Refunds  7  + 
c5 LNEXRT  Exchange Rates  8  + 
c6 MREF  Dummy for Mac Sharry Reforms  3  - 
c7 AREF  Dummy for Agenda 2000 Reforms  6  - 
c8 SPS  Dummy for SPS Regulations  6  - 
d2 LNDMPR  Domestic Price  9  + 
d3 LNWORLDP  World Price  1  - 
d4 LNEXRT  Exchange Rates  6  - 
d5 LNIMPL  Import Levies  4  - 
d6 MREF  Dummy for Mac Sharry Reforms  4  - 
d7 AREF  Dummy for Agenda 2000 Reforms  5  - 
d8 LNGDP  GDP 7  + 
d9 SPS  Dummy for SPS Regulations  6  - 
e2 LNDMPR  Domestic Price  11  + 
e3 LNPRODR  Production refunds  5  + 
e4 MREF  Dummy for Mac Sharry Reforms  3  - 
e5 AREF  Dummy for Agenda 2000 Reforms  5  - 
e6 LNGDP  GDP 6  + 
* The expected sign on the parameter estimates represents the hypothesized relationship (positive 
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Table 3. Three-stage Least Square Estimation of Inventory Demand of Corn for EU 
Countries 
 
   lndmpr  (lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp 
France 2.4291 *-1.1308 *6.8775     
Austria 0.4548 *-1.4601 *1.6391   
Belgium -0.1143 *-1.3639 *8.0129   
Germany -0.3687 *-1.3698 *10.2927   
Denmark 1.1797 -1.9071 *7.9908   
Ireland 2.4331 *-15.4992 *2.3128   
Italy 10.6049 *-2.0666 *0.3465   
Netherlands 1.5919 0.7084 0.1787   
Spain -4.3926 -0.7786 *14.6784   
UK -3.7344 *-2.1782 *2.0325   
Greece 0.1915 *-5.2283 *15.3625   
Portugal 1.5815 -9.0079 7.4503     




Table 4. Three-stage Least Square Estimation of Domestic Demand of Corn for EU 
Countries 
   lnconp  mref  aref  lnopstk  lngdp 
France 1.5864  -0.9571 *-0.2615 *-0.5059 *-0.3987  *0.2841
Austria 0.1518  *-0.2278 *-0.3019 *-0.4499 *-0.1930  *0.4211
Belgium 0.0022  -0.0280 *-0.5493 *-0.8450 *-2.9499  *0.4117
Germany 0.1125  -0.1109 *-0.3814 *-0.5319 *-0.1698  *0.3985
Denmark 0.0782  *0.1012 *-0.3553 *-0.7118 *-1.3429  *0.3548
Ireland 5.1448  -0.1078 *-0.3198 *-0.5977 -5.5549  0.0961
Italy 0.0823  -0.0261 *-0.5861 *-0.8022 0.2306  0.2961
Netherlands 0.0710  -0.1623 *-0.3966 *-0.6705 0.2485  *0.3608
Spain 1.5152  -0.0354 *-0.4130 *-0.6469 -0.0710  0.0448
UK 0.1052  -0.2633 *-0.3094 *-0.4530 -0.0095  *7.3998
Greece 12.4165  -0.1141 *-0.5759 *-0.9699 *-0.2662  *-0.8370
Portugal 0.0387  *-5.6676 *-0.4179 *-0.6859 *-10.5490  *0.3414
 
Note:  Single asterisks (*) for parameter estimates indicates significance at 10 percent level. 
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Table 5. Three-stage Least Square Estimation of Export Demand of Corn for EU Countries 
   lndmpr  lnworldp lnexpr lnexrt mref aref sps
France 0.0452  -0.4647  *1.1147 *7.6408 *1.2940 -0.2933  *0.9896  *-0.4532
Austria 0.8300  *-24.0806  *3.7138 *2.1208 1.8722 -0.3158  *-1.3599  *-1.3650
Belgium 8.0153  -2.6844  0.0760 0.0765 1.7163 -0.5593  *-3.1796  -0.3785
Germany 0.0545  -0.2497  0.2113 *7.9629 *2.0066 *-4.4726  *-0.3959  *-0.5976
Denmark 3.7721  -1.1454  0.1557 0.0938 *5.1419 0.3526  -0.6012  -1.7652
Ireland 0.9714  -7.1385  0.2133 *1.9822 *3.2134 0.1019  *3.2134  0.1134
Italy -3.3167  *-17.4387  *0.9316 0.0147 *3.8825 -0.3245  -0.1237  *-0.4765
Netherlands 0.0222  *-1.2656  *1.0173 *17.2986 *2.0703 -0.2814  -0.2945  -0.3467
Spain 50.9711  -4.3452  *1.8219 0.0107 0.9419 -1.3810  -0.2315  *-0.6742
UK 8.6676  -0.6436  0.2514 0.0822 *1.9472 *-1.5781  -0.5876  *-1.1599
Greece 2.4081  -24.4435  0.2882 *0.8527 *5.7596 *-2.2067  *-3.4022  2.3451
Portugal 14.1762  *-6.4258  1.4014 *0.6455 0.0882 -0.9874  -1.5492  -1.2904
 
Note:  Single asterisks (*) for parameter estimates indicates significance at 10 percent level. 
 
Table 6. Three-stage Least Square Estimation of Import Demand of Corn for EU Countries 
     lndmpr  lnworldp lnexrt lnimpl mref aref lngdp sps
France 15.0454  *0.7830  -0.4174 *-0.7218 *-0.4535 *-0.8040  *-0.5426  *0.5033 *-0.2987
Austria 13.8964  *1.1894  -0.0574 -1.9580 -0.3493 -1.6638  -1.7132  1.7894 *-0.9621
Belgium 11.2358  0.6609  0.1947 -0.0504 *-0.6429 0.4353  -0.0691  0.3382 -0.5692
Germany 17.3134  *1.3946  0.0535 *-0.7015 -0.0186 0.1646  *-0.5660  *0.3877 *-0.6391
Denmark 0.5115  *27.1891  -0.1565 -0.3519 -0.1378 *-1.7848  -0.1218  *0.8723 0.5498
Ireland 0.3791  *5.2281  -0.4390 -0.4410 0.0425 0.1620  *-0.2423  *0.7158 0.5987
Italy 0.1686  *19.2091  0.2489 -1.1304 0.0173 0.0417  *-0.4851  0.4620 *-0.1392
Netherlands 0.1024  *19.4245  -0.1532 *-0.8736 *-0.4263 -0.0831  -0.0551  0.0696 -0.4581
Spain 0.8354  1.1364  -0.0855 *-9.7622 -0.0308 0.0971  0.6342  *1.8301 *-0.9136
UK 0.3043  *9.2080  *-0.4408 *-0.7743 -0.0252 0.1374  0.2290  0.0789 *-0.3982
Greece 24.0424  1.3439  -0.9687 -0.1289 *-0.5208 *1.1264  -0.6342  *1.9946 0.7640
Portugal 5.1399  *1.5322  -0.1289 *-0.4067 -0.0390 *0.8615  *1.2825  *1.1144 -1.7439
 
Note:  Single asterisks (*) for parameter estimates indicates significance at 10 percent level. 
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Table 7. Three-stage Least Square Estimation of Total Supply of Corn for EU Countries 
     lndmpr lnprodr mref aref lngdp
France 0.2410  *6.4567 0.1071 0.1349 -0.1632  0.1700
Austria 0.0800  *3.9043 0.0641 -0.1777 -0.0311  0.2075
Belgium 0.0780  *0.6805 *1.2909 *-0.8815 *-5.2495  *0.8355
Germany -5.3971  *0.5739 *0.1148 0.1771 -0.1192  *0.8396
Denmark 1.7870  *12.5899 0.5839 1.2494 *-1.8924  1.3409
Ireland -3.6055  *30.1242 *7.9685 -1.2913 -0.2696  0.1422
Italy -0.3413  *29.4847 *0.2101 -0.0410 *-0.5989  0.0729
Netherlands -0.1300  *6.2647 *7.4018 -0.4306 -0.1530  *5.5761
Spain -0.2747  *0.4349 0.0446 *-0.5627 *-0.6438  *0.4651
UK -38.4882  4.4465 1.0243 -0.4703 -1.4000  2.9793
Greece 3.0158  *0.2799 0.0136 *-0.8465 *-0.9805  *0.4247
Portugal -2.1576  *3.8979 0.3632 -0.0288 -0.1186  *0.1412
 
Note:  Single asterisks (*) for parameter estimates indicates significance at 10 percent level. 
 
Table 8. Estimates of Welfare Effects (Percentage Change from Baseline) from Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Regulations on Imported Corn in the EU 
   Producer Surplus  Consumer Surplus  Net Welfare* 
France 5.762 -1.198 -0.794
Austria 2.503 -1.736 -1.386
Belgium 2.761 -0.885 -0.972
Germany 3.487 -1.165 -1.067
Denmark 1.042 -0.650 -0.893
Ireland 1.102 -0.387 -0.091
Italy 2.309 -1.067 -1.162
Netherlands 2.861 -0.800 -1.071
Spain 3.100 -1.276 -1.120
UK 2.980 -0.892 -1.852
Greece 3.486 -0.792 -0.848
Portugal 1.687 -0.961 -0.692
 
*Net Welfare includes estimates of government transfers and dead weight losses from SPS 
regulations.  32
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